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Traditionally, health care systems in the EU had been excluded from intra-European 
competition. The paper analyses the economic impact of a leading decision of the 
European Court of Justice which recently applied the principle of free movement to the 
health care sector. Depending on interregional differences in the price and quality of 
health services, patients will now be able to choose between European health care 
providers. Since in all EU-memberstates prices and qualities are strongly determined by 
regulations, patients "voting by feet" will induce endogenous pressure on the current 
institutional design in the health care sector, in particular the financing schemes. The 
paper examines the effects of liberalization under the current regulatory framework. 
Comparing welfare before and after liberalization, in a model it is shown that 
deregulation will not only yield welfare gains for low-quality regions but might also 
improve welfare in EU-memberstates which are subsidizing health services in order to 
guarantee a high quality of medical treatment. Net welfare gains from subsidization, 
however, proove to be sensible to the extent domestic health care facilities are used by 
foreign patients. Therefore, since patient migration cannot be controlled after full 
liberalization, high-quality EU-memberstates cannot be expected to support a complete 
liberalization. 
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Economic integration in Europe is creating new problems for social security systems. 
Until recently the national health care systems in the European Union had been widely 
excluded from liberalization and intra-European competition. Patients were restricted to 
domestic providers of health care. This ruling was changed last year by a leading 
decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) who applied the principle of free 
movement to the health care sector. Depending on their mobility and preferences, 
individuals will now be able to choose between European providers of health services. 
Since the prices and the quality of health services in the EU-memberstates are strongly 
determined by regulations, patients „voting by feet“ will induce regulatory competition 
among heterogenous European health care systems, generating endogenous pressure on 
the institutional design, in particular the financing schemes of health services. 
The implications of the verdict are currently subject to negotiations among European 
memberstates. At the last EU-council meeting of European Ministers for Health in June 
1999, the council adressed the tension between the rules of the internal market and the 
organisation and delivery of health services in the memberstates.1 Most governments 
still seem to be reluctant to the ECJ´s decision, arguing it endangers the stability of 
national health care systems. This attitude partly reflects the concern of loosing control 
in a policy field which represents important socio-economic goals, as national health 
care systems cleary reflect heterogeneous social values and historically rooted 
traditions. Even more relevant might be the fact that still very little is known about the 
economic consequences of implementing free movement to the European health care 
sector. This can be attributed to shortcomings in research. Research in health economics 
has been more concerned with the question how to enforce competition within a given 
health care system than analyzing the impact of competition among heterogeneous 
national systems. 
The existing literature in health economics provides some insight in the determinants of 
consumers´ choice regarding health services, indicating that patients´ incentives to seek 
care abroad depend on their perception of interregional quality differences, on the 
individual expenses which have to be borne for medical treatment, and on transaction 
costs.2 
Recent work on the field of cross-border care in Europe has focused on the determinants 
of patient migration and the extent and nature of cross-border transactions in the past. 
These cases took place on the grounds of very limited exemptions from current 
regulations, allowing the use of health care facilities abroad in the cases of migrant 
workers, temporary stays and after pre-authorization of the domestic health insurer. 
Crivelli and Zweifel (1996) try to explain patients demand for foreign care, employing a 
                                                 
1  Resolution of the Health Council meeting, Luxemburg, 8.6.1999. 
2  See Burns, L. (1992); Crivelli, L; Zweifel, P. (1996); France, G. (1997); Garnick, D.W.; et al. (1989), 




conditional choice model and testing results against empirical data concerning 
applications for pre-authorization in different European countries. France (1997) 
investigates the determinants of patient mobility from a microeconomic perspective. 
Hermesse et al. (1997) assess the relevance of cross-border care and the volume of 
interregional financial flows among social security systems due to cross-border care. 
Various empirical studies investigate the attitude of patients towards using health care 
facilities abroad [Starmans et al. (1997); Calnan et al. (1997)] or investigate intra-
national mobility of patients in order to draw more general conclusions with respect to 
the European Union [Crivelli (1998); Kyriopoulus et al. (1998)]. Generally, due to a 
lack of EU-wide micro data, empirical literature concentrates on border regions and 
country case studies. However, theoretical and empirical research in the field of cross-
border care still seems to be quite in its beginnings, particulary with respect to the 
economic impact for the EU-memberstates after full liberalization.3 
The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate the welfare effects of the ECJ decision 
under the assumption that the current financing scheme for cross-border care in Europe 
is maintained. Special attention is drawn on the impact of interregional quality 
differences and the effects of subsidization in the health care sector. Patient mobility - 
as the driving force behind the competition process - is determined by transaction costs 
and interregional differences in prices and the quality of health care services. According 
to the results of the simulations liberalization will stnot only yield welfare gains for 
low-quality regions but might also improve welfare in EU-memberstates which 
subsidize health services in order to guarantee a high quality of medical treatment. Net 
welfare gains from subsidization, however, proove to be rather sensible to the extent 
domestic health care facilities are used by foreign patients. Therefore, since 
interregional patient migration cannot be controlled after full liberalization, high-quality 
EU-memberstates cannot be expected to support a complete liberalization. 
Section 2 summerizes the basic facts about the current regulatory framework and the 
financial settlements regarding the consumption of foreign health care services in the 
European Union. Section 3 examines the determinants of patient mobility and the 
impact on allocation and financial flows in the European health care sector. In section 4 
a model, allowing for different qualities of health services, is introduced to analyze the 
impact of cross-border care on welfare. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.  
2.  The legal framework for cross-border care in the European 
Union 
The verdict of the ECJ implies a fundamental change in the organization of health care 
markets in the European Union. Traditionally, the national health care systems in the 
                                                 
3  The economic impact of introducing freedom of choice to the European health services sector, in 
particular with respect to EU-enlargement, is subject of a current research project at the Institute for 




EU had been widely excluded from the basic principles of European Integration, the 
free movement of labour, capital, goods and services. This is due to the fact that 
member states insisted on having control on domestic health care provision, the design 
of health insurances and benefit schemes and the financial impact of health protection. 
As a result health care systems in Europe differ extremely with respect to insurance 
schemes, benefit packages, co-payments, the proportion of public and private provision 
of health care services and the prices and quality of health goods and services.4 
In order to ensure subsidiarity in the field of health policy the so-called „Principle of 
Territoriality“ was applied to the health care sector. As a general rule it says that 
European citizens are restricted to domestic providers of health goods and services and 
that they are solely entitled to the benefit packages emumerated by the domestic health 
insurance system.5 There are only very limited exemptions from this ruling in order to 
guarantee the mobility of labour in the Single Market. These exemptions are specified 
in EU-coordination rules.6 According to EU-regulation health care coverage in a non-
resident EU-memberstate is only given either in the case of migrant workers or, during 
temporary stays (i.e. tourists, professionals) if immediate care is necessary or, after a 
pre-authorization by the domestic health insurer. The aim of the latter is to overcome 
structural gaps and capacity problems of domestic health care providers, especially in 
border regions.  
The nature of the medical treatment which can be obtained abroad and the billing rules 
in cases of cross-border are also subject to European law.7 These regulations can be 
considered to be very important with respect to the microeconomic and macroeconomic 
effects of introducing freedom of choice in the health services sector. Essentially, there 
are two rules which influence patients´ incentives to seek care abroad. Firstly, the costs 
of health care provided abroad have to be borne by the social security system of the 
treated person.8 Secondly, the medical treatment follows the rules of the providing state: 
patients receive the benefits which are enumerated by the health care system of the host 
country and they are obliged to co-payments according to the rules of the providing 
health care system.  
As empirical evidence shows, due to the Principle of Territoriality and the restrictive 
use of pre-authorization by national insurer, cross-border care has been of minor 
importance in the past. The use of medical facilities abroad has been institutionalized 
                                                 
4  See for example van Kalisch, D.W.; Aman, T.; Buchele, L. (1998), OECD (1998), van Kemenade, 
Y.W. (1997).  
5  Privately funded health insurances do allow medical treatment abroad but still play a minor role in 
Europe. 
6  Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72.  
7   These EU-regulations are added by bilalateral agreements of the memberstates. 
8  Generally, full cost claiming is applied by the providing state, but in some cases (i.e.pensioners) flat 
rate claims are applied (Hermesse, J.; Lewalle, H.; Palm, W., 1997, 6). Member states can also alter 




mainly by two countries, Italy and Luxembourg.9 Luxembourg as a small country relies 
to some extent upon health care services across the border. In Italy, dissatisfaction with 
the quality of medical treatment with regard to serious diseases seems to be responsible 
for the relatively high importance of cross-border care.10 But, all in all, the financial 
transfers from cross-border care amounted only to 1,1 billion ECU in 1993 which 
represents about 0.25 % in terms of total EU health care expenditure.11 
This situation can be expected to change significantly in the future, as the ECJ´s verdict 
might imply a general entitlement for EU-citizens to medical treatment across the whole 
territory of the European Union.12 The health insurance associations of two 
Luxembourg citizens who had purchased medical goods and services in Germany 
refused reimbursement, arguing they had not submitted themselves to the pre-
authorization procedure before going abroad. The insured claimed their right of free 
movement was affected, which is guaranteed by the European Treaties. The court in 
Luxembourg referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary interpretation of Community 
law. The ECJ emphazised free movement as the fundamental principle of the Single 
Market, at the same time denying the relevance of the Articles 36 and 66 of the 
European Treaties, which enable memberstates to restrict free movement of goods and 
services in order to protect public health. 
European governments and health-institutions might be so alert about the ECJ-decision 
because it explicitely referred to pre-authorized care, wich counts responsible for the 
financial core of cross-border care: 60% of claims were related to the rather costly pre-
authorized (hospital) care.13 There is also some evidence that the allocation of cases 
treated abroad seem to follow medical knowledge and biomedical know-how, meaning 
some countries absorb patients with particular (serious) diseases.14 Memberstates 
claimed that the judgement endangers the financial stability of health care systems and 
restricts their ability to plan capacities. This would give rise to inefficiencies in the 
health care sector. The ECJ generally accepted the argument of efficiency problems in 
the in-patient sector but rejected it for the amulant care. However, it seems likely that 
this will not protect the hospital sector from cross-border mobility.15 Therefore, the 
economic impact of the ECJ´s decision is of major importance for the member states. 
                                                 
9  Hermesse, J.; Lewalle, H.; Palm, W. (1997), 7pp. 
10  France, G. (1997), 23. 
11  Crivelli, L; Zweifel, P. (1996), 377. 
12  Cases C-120/95 and C-158/96. 
13  Hermesse, J.; Lewalle, H.; Palm, W. (1997), 7. 
14  Kyripoulos, J.; Gitona, M. (1998), 313. 




3.  The impact of patient mobility on allocation and financial 
flows in the European health care sector 
Although beeing extremely heterogeneous, in all European health care systems the 
prices and the quality of medical treatment are more or less regulated. Depending on the 
properties of medical services, introducing freedom of choice will induce changing 
patterns of consumption, reallocation of resources in the health care sector and alter 
financial flows among the European social security systems. This will finally generate 
endogenous pressure on the regulatory design of the national health care systems. The 
effects on overall welfare can be expected to depend firstly on the patients´ motivation 
to migrate and, secondly, on the financing schemes. 
3.1 Determinants of patients´ mobility 
From a microeconomic perspective, the allocative effects depend on the degree of 
patients´ mobility. Hence, the crucial question is which the variables are, that determine 
patients´ incentives to move. The existing literature in health economics indicates that 
consumers´ choice of health services is strongly influenced by three variables: 
individual expenses that have to borne by the patients, differences in the quality of 
medical treatment, and transaction costs.16 Their relevance for our problem shall be 
briefly discussed. 
To analyze the influence of individual expenses on EU-citizens´ incentives to use health 
care facilities abroad it is important to keep in mind that, under the current regulation, 
the costs for medical treatment have to be borne by the domestic health insurance. 
Patients only have to cover potential co-payments in the host country. Therefore, the 
individual insurance tarif represents an exogenous variable with respect to the patients´ 
decision to seek care abroad. Instead, foreign cost-sharing rules should be taken into 
account. 
Public authorities do not only determine the fees but also the quality of domestic health 
services. In all EU-memberstates regulations impose quality standards and give binding 
recommendations regarding the benefits which are covered by the national health 
service or health insurance. The quality of services is also influenced by educational and 
training standards for the workforce and regulations concerning the diffusion of high-
cost medical devices. 
The third variable which can be considered to influence patients´ willingness to seek 
foreign medical treatment, but is not influenced by regulations, are transaction costs.17 
                                                 
16  See Burns, L. (1992); Crivelli, L. (1998); Crivelli, L; Zweifel, P. (1996); France, G. (1997); Garnick, 
D.W.; et al. (1989), Luft, H.S.; et al. (1990); Manning, W.G.; et al. (1987), Werden, G.J. (1989). 
According to the literature, physicians incentives to provide care to migrating patients can also be 
expected to relate to billing rules (Ellis, R.P.; Mc Guire; T.G. (1986); Reinhardt, U. (1987)). Since 
supplier behaviour is of minor relevance under the current regulatory framework for cross-border 
care, this aspect is neglected. 




If patients, following the ECJ´s verdict, will be allowed to choose among different 
European providers, they have to spend information costs in order to compare the 
quality of medical treatment, as well as the benefit-schemes and co-payments in 
different health insurance systems. The transaction costs will also include travel costs. 
Since information cost can be assumed to decrease by linguistic and ethnic 
homogeneity, both information and travel cost should be related to distance. Hence, it 
can be assumed that especially EU-neighbourstates with large differences regarding the 
benefits and the co-payments of health services are likely to be concerned about and to 
have to deal with patient migration. 
3.2 The influence of financing schemes 
On the macroeconomic level the existing financing schemes for health services 
represent a focal point with respect to the economic impact of cross-border care. In 
particular, two aspects have to be considered for analysis: Firstly, public subsidizing of 
health care capacities will create externalities among the memberstates. Secondly, 
incentives resulting from the current regulations regarding cross-border care can be 
expected to induce patient migration and alter financial flows among European social 
security systems. This will lead to distributive externalities in the national social 
security systems. 
Though differing in extent and nature, the provision of health services is subsidized in 
all European countries. In some countries, like Great Britain, a tax financed public 
health service provides medical treatment. In other EU-memberstates the state takes 
financial responsibility for investment in the hospital sector (Germany) or gives 
financial support through grants to public health insurances (Belgium). From an 
allocative perspective these subsidies can partly be justified with market failure arising 
in the health care market. Even more relevant for governments and health-institutions 
are certainly distributive and socio-political goals, in particular to ensure universal 
access to medical treatment for the whole population, independently of the individual 
income. The proportion of public spending in the health care sector varies considerably 
among the EU-memberstates18 and might be interpreted as reflecting social preferences 
for a public good „health care“.Yet, the question arises how European governments will 
handle liberalization under these circumstances.  
Subsidizing the provision of health services implies that prices do not reflect real costs. 
It is obvious that cross-border care will lead to externalities among the EU-
memberstates as the health insurances of migrating patients will profit from subsidized 
services which are financed by the providing state. Therefore, under the current 
financing scheme, governments or health institutions in EU-memberstates with low 
spending in health care might have an incentive to support the use of health care 
facilities abroad by their citizens. At the same time, European countries which subsidize 
                                                 




the provision of health care in order to guarantee a high quality of medical treatment 
might reject the use of domestic capacities by non-residents.  
The second important aspect with regard to financial settlements, which generates 
externalities, are the effects on the social security system in the home country of 
migrating patients. According to the current billing rules the costs have to be borne by 
the domestic health institution and the patients will not take these costs into account. 
What will be the impact on the domestic health care system? It can be assumed that 
high quality treatment - especially in the hospital sector – relies on a costly high-tech 
endowment and is positively correlated with high fees. Furthermore, it can be expected 
that first of all patients with serious diseases will be attracted by foreign high-quality 
treatment. Therefore, the social security systems of low-quality states can be expected 
to face a substantial increase in costs. Sooner or later these additional costs will lead to 
rising insurance tariffs or taxes in the home country of migrating patients. Given a non-
proportional distribution of the benefits from cross-border care (because not all 
individuals will take advantage of it) this will create negative externalities among the 
insured in the domestic social security system. 
The results from analysis at this point can be summarized as follows: Patients´ mobility 
after introducing freedom of choice can be expected to depend on total individual costs 
(including co-payments and transaction costs) and on differences in the quality of the 
health services. The current financing scheme of cross-border care creates negative 
externalities in a twofold way. Firstly, subsidizing health care facilities leads to negative 
externalities in the providing country because residents have to finance subsidized 
services which are consumed by non-residents. Secondly, distributional externalities 
arise in the home country of the migrating patients, if only a part of the population takes 
advantage of foreign care, but costs have to be borne by all individuals. In terms of 
making the model managable, the distributional aspects shall be ignored in the 
following welfare analysis; instead it is assumed that migrating patients have to bear all 
costs of the received medical treatment. 
4.  The welfare effects of cross-border care: A simple model 
4.1 The model 
The model analyzes the welfare effects of cross-border care in a two country case with 
different quality levels in medical services. The aim is to investigate the externalities 
which arise if a high-quality country subsidizes health services which are also 
consumed by migrating patients from a low-quality country. 
Crucial questions regarding the deregulation of health care in Europe are firstly wether 
introducing freedom of choice under the current regulatory framework will improve 
welfare and, secondly, which countries will finally benefit from cross-border care. In 




the health care sector will depend considerably on the expectations of the memberstates 
about the distribution of welfare among low-quality and high-quality regions. 
Especially high-income EU-memberstates which subsidize health services in order to 
guarantee a high level of quality might be rejecting the use of domestic health capacities 
by foreigners. 
In the model, country 1 (2) offers a high-quality (low-quality) service. In both countries, 
medical treatment is provided by an organization which can be interpreted as a public 
health service. Before free movement is introduced to the health care sector the situation 
is regarded as two national monopolies, since consumers can only purchase health 
services which are offered by the domestic provider.19 Introducing free movement leads 
to duopolistic competition in a Cournot setting.20 That means, providers of health 
services will compete in quantities, both assuming that the output of the foreign supplier 
will remain the same in each market. For simplicity, fixed costs are sunk and marginal 
costs are normalized to zero. The model may not perfectly suit the stylized facts in 
health service provision in general, but will help to understand the effects at work. 
In both countries, individuals derive utility from the consumption of health services (x, 
y) and other goods which are represented by a numéraire z. The utility function is 
additive and separable in the consumption of health care and the numéraire z and can be 
written as21: 
[1]    ) ( ) , ( ) , , ( z U y x U z y x U + =
[2]  z z U = ) ( 
[3]          a >1, b = 1  bxy y y x ax y x U − − + − =
2 2 5 , 0 5 , 0 ) , (
where z is the numéraire, x is the high quality service provided by country 1, y the low 
quality service of country 2, and a is a positive coefficient for quality. Assume b = 1 for 
perfect substitutes. 
An asymmetric structure is introduced to the model in order to compute the incentive 
structures resulting from current regulations which were described in the previous 
section: once free consumer choice is given, it is assumed that only patients of the low-
quality region will switch to the foreign provider because they will profit from 
                                                 
19 As monopoly represents a clearly unefficient way to provide goods – even if producer rents are 
redistributed - the welfare effects of liberalization tend to be overestimated in the model. But, for our 
purpose and taking into account the inefficiencies which are stated for most of the health care 
systems, this setting is considered to be more realistic than the assumption of a welfare maximizing 
planner. 
20  The basic structure of the model follows a work by Brander, J.A. (1981), in which the effects of intra-
industry trade are analyzed in a Cournot setting. 
21  This assumption implies that income effects are zero, which can be justified if only a small fraction of 
the income is spent on health care. This is the case for cross-border care since under the current 




subsidized high-quality services whereas inhabitants of the high-quality region do not 
have an incentive to move. 
Therefore, consumers´ benefits depend on the market structure, as shown in the scheme 
below: Before deregulation, patients in both countries can only obtain medical treatment 
by the domestic provider which means the utility functions only contains the domestic 
service (x = 0 for residents of country 2, and vice versa). After deregulation, patients of 
the low-quality region may also benefit from consumption of the foreign service. 
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The properties of the employed utility function shall be discussed briefly. Marginal 
benefits from health care are positive and decreasing with rising quantities until the total 
benefit function reaches its maximum. After that point total benefits will fall because, in 
contradiction to other goods, the consumption of medical treatment does not spend 
utility itself. Instead, benefits depend on the health status. Hence, the consumption of 
additional services (i.e. X-rays, heart surgeries) exceeding the optimal level of treatment 
can be expected to reduce total benefits for the patients.22 
The financing scheme of health services is modeled as follows: In both countries, the 
price p of health services is subsidized by the amount s per unit. Subsidies are financed 
by taxes. Excluding deficit-spending, subsidies have to equal tax revenues in each 
sector (country). Since the introduction of taxes and subsidies to an equilibrium 
generally leads to allocative distortions the problem arises, how to isolate those welfare 
effects from the externalities which emerge specifically from migrating patients. This 
problem is solved in the model by postulating that taxes are also levied on a per unit 
basis on the price of health services. The result is that in the case of non-tradable 
services (cases I – III) a given per unit subsidy rate s = sx/x corresponds with an 
identical tax rate t = tx/x; so (p – s + t) equals p and the net effect on the price and 
demand of health services is zero. This is not the case in the tradebles sector (the high-
quality service x after deregulation) as a rising consumption of the subsidized high-
quality service by foreigners will enlarge the tax burden of the population of country 1. 
Hence, the tax will exceed the subsidy 
(t - s > 0) and this in turn will increase the price of health services. An interesting 
question to be examined is wether this potentially negative impact on welfare in country 
                                                 
22  A hyperbolic utility function describing patient´s benefits from hospital services was introduced by 




1 is offset by an increasing production, since subsidizing the domestic service has the 
same effect as an export subsidy. 
Consumers maximze utility, given the general budget constraint M = pxx + pyy + pzz (in 
monopoly pyy = 0 for inhabitants of country 1, and vice versa).23 After deregulation the 
expenses for the high-quality service will be altered for residents of country 1 and 2 in a 
different way: 
– Migrating patients from the low-quality country 2 will have to bear transaction costs 
k, arising from information and travel costs. Therefore, transaction costs will increase 
the price of the foreign service. At the same time these patients profit from the fact 
that health services are subsidized by the amount s per unit in the high-quality country 
1. 
– For inhabitants of the high-quality region the price of domestic health services will 
rise because migrating patients will enhance aggregate demand for domestic services, 
increase in value the subsidies and therefore the tax burden t. 
In the following, the equilibria before and after liberalization are determined first. After 
this the welfare effects resulting from cross-border care under the current regulatory 
regime are investigated.  
4.2 Equilibrium before liberalization (Monopoly) 
Before liberalization consumers are solely entitled to medical treatment which is 
provided by the domestic health organization. Maximization of the utitlity functions 
under the budget constraint leads to the inverse demand functions px in country 1 and 
py in country 224: 
[4]  x a x px − = ) ( 
[5]    y y py − =1 ) (
Profit function of providers of health services are: 
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a p p y x ). Equilibrium sales and prices in 
country 1 are positively correlated to the quality level a. 
 
                                                 
23 See  Appendix. 




Overall (European) welfare in monopoly (W
m) is defined as the sum of consumer and 
producer surplus in country 1 and country 2: 
[8]    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
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In monopoly, the level of European welfare W
m depends only on the quality a of health 
services in country 1: 
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4.3 Equilibrium with cross-border care (Duopoly) 
Introducing free movement to the model will only induce changing patterns of demand 
by the residents of country 2 because, due to the current EU-regulation, inhabitants of 
European high-quality countries do not have an incentive to go abroad. Therefore, in the 
model it is assumed that residents of the high-quality country 1 will only purchase 
services in their home country.  
In duopoly, the inverse demand functions derived from equations [1] - [3] under the 
budget constraint are25: 
[10]  ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2
1 y x x k t s a y x px + + + + − + =  
[11]    2 1 ) , ( x y y x py − − =
Due to b = 1 in equation [3], each unit of x2 consumed by patients of country 2 will 
exactly reduce demand for the domestic service y by one unit. Demand for x is 
positively related to quality a and subsidies s, and negatively to transaction costs k, 
which have to be borne by consumers from country 2, as well as to the tax, which has to 
be financed by residents of country 1. This is because growing aggregate demand for x 
increases the net price inhabitants of country 1 have to pay for health services.  
Profit functions of the health care suppliers in each country are:  
[12]  [] ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2
1 x x y x x k t s a y x x + ⋅ + + + + − + = π  ∧  x1 + x2 = x 
[13]    [] y x y y x y ⋅ − − = 2 1 ) , ( π
The first order conditions  0
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 maximize profits. 
Equilibrium output and prices are26: 
                                                 
25  For derivation of demand functions see Appendix B.  
26  The second order condition for a global maximum is fulfilled since the profit functions are continuous 
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where   (x ) is the quantiy of the high-quality service which is consumed by the 
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A higher quality of health services in country 1 induces substitution of y, leading to 
increased sales of x2. At the same time, this raises the tax burden of the residents in 
country 1 and reduces demand for x1. Nevertheless, in terms of aggregate sales  
[19] 
∗ ∗ ∗ + = 2 1 x x x () t s k a 2 6 4 6 2
5
1
− + − + − =  
the positive influence of quality and subsidies clearly outweights the negative effect of 
taxation.  
Transaction costs k have a negative impact on the consumption of the high-quality 
health service by residents of country 2. For a given quality a and subsidy s, distance 
and information asymmetries can therefore be expected to create a clear barrier to the 
migration of patients. For clearer results of welfare analysis, transaction costs shall be 
ignored in the following. 
4.4 Welfare Effects 
The welfare effects of liberalization represent a focal point regarding current 
negotiations among the EU-memberstates and future deregulation in the European 
health care sector. One would intuitively expect efficiency gains from an intensified 
competition. Still, it remains open how these welfare gains will be distributed, how they 
are influenced by interregional quality differentials, and wether subsidizing high-quality 
regions will be worse off or might even gain from liberalization since subsidizing a 
tradeable service might to some degree work as an export subsidy. 
Therefore, the investigation of welfare effects from liberalization shall focus on two 
aspects: 
1.  The comparison of overall (European) welfare before and after liberalization 
depending on the level of subsidization in the high-quality country 1, and 
2.  The assessment of welfare in the high-quality country 1 after liberalization, 




Hence, in both cases a and s are the independent variables and welfare is the dependent 
variable. 
Overall welfare 
Analogously to equation [8] welfare in duopoly (W
d) is defined as the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus in both countries: 
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Unlike the case of monopoly (see [9]), W
d not only depends on the quality parameter a, 
but also on subsidies s and taxes t, soW .27   ) , , ( t s a W
d d =
At the same time, s and t are corresponding variables (s is a function of t and vice 
versa). Therefore, the model has to be closed by implementing the macroeconomic 
budget constraint of country 1 
[21] 
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Inserting the equilibrium output  ,   from equations [13] and [14] into [21] leads to 














which fulfills the macroeconomic budget constraint for all given values of a and s.28 
The welfare function W
d(a,s) which can now be calculated from [20] by substituting t 
describes overall welfare after introducing competition to the health care sector. It 
depends on quality differentials between country 1 and 2, and the level of subsidization 
in country 1. To investigate the welfare gains from deregulation, a welfare function 
W
net (a,s) = W
d(a,s) – W
m(a) is defined, where W
m(a) describes overall welfare before 
liberalization (see [8]). 
Results show, that – independently of the quality level in country 1 – welfare gains from 
liberalization are always positive, given a realistic value of the subsidy rate. This can be 
attributed to efficiency gains from competition, an increased production in country 1 
and the fact that residents of country 2 realize welfare gains from a higher quality of 
medical treatment, which is provided at comparable low (subsidized) prices. The 
outcome from simulations of W
net (a,s), varying the quality parameter a, is illustrated in 
Graph 1. 
                                                 
27  This can be easily seen by having a look at the equations [10], [11], and [14] – [18]. 
28  Due to a square root term, two mathematical solutions exist for t*. The second solution proposes a 




























Results also proove that in terms of overall welfare the positive impact of an improved 
care for patients from the low-quality region is clearly dominating the potentially 
negative impact of subsidies. Welfare gains from liberalization rise with interregional 
quality differentials. 
Welfare gains from subsidization in the high-quality country 
Even more interesting than overall welfare gains from deregulation might be the pay-
offs of high-quality (and presumably high-income) regions which subsidize health 
services. To isolate the effects of subsidies on the welfare of country 1, the welfare 
function W1
net (a,s) = W1
d (a,s) - W1
d(a) is defined. Both W1
d (a,s) and W1
d(a) describe 
welfare in country 1 after liberalization, but W1
d(a) represents the hypothetical welfare 
that would have been realized in a duopoly without subsidizing x. In other words, W1
net 
describes welfare gains of country 1 from subsidization. 
Again, running simulations of W1
net for different quality levels of x shows that 
subsidizing health services can even lead to a net welfare gain in the high-quality region 
(Graph 2). This can be explained by the fact that s works as an export-subsidy, thus 
increasing production in country 1. Still, welfare gains from subsidization proove to be 
quite small. The maximum net welfare gain in Graph 2 is 0.001, which is so small that it 




Graph 2: Net-Welfare Gains of Country 1 from Subsidization (W1
net) 











The results also show that for each quality level a, there does exist a critical value s* 
where welfare gains from subsidization W1
net  get zero. Note that s* and W1
net are 
negatively correlated to quality: With a rising quality, net welfare gains from 
subsidization and s* decrease. How can this be explained? 
The reason is that a higher quality of x leads to enhanced sales of x1 and x2 which in turn 
increase the tax burden in country 1, and therefore reduce welfare. To get a better 
understanding of the significance of s*, the equilibrium values of s* in Graph 2 have 
been set into proportion to the corresponding market price for health services provided 
by country 1. It turns out that s* is about 10% of the price at a rather small quality 
differential (a = 1.1) among country 1 and 2, and 2% if there are substantial differences 
in the quality of medical treatment among both countries (a = 1.25). In other words, the 
high-quality country will realize a net welfare gain from subsidizing if s lies within a 
realistic range with respect to the market price. 
It can be summarized that subsidizing health services in high quality regions after 
liberalization can lead to a net welfare gain in these countries. But, at the same time, 
this welfare gain diminishes with a growing use of domestic health care facilities by 
non-residents. The latter cannot be controlled after introducing freedom of choice. 
Therefore, high-quality countries will not have an incentive to support full liberalization 







The paper examines the welfare effects of introducing freedom of choice to the health 
services sector in the European Union. For interpretation of the results it has to be kept 
in mind that welfare effects from liberalization tend to be overestimated due to a rather 
inefficent reference situation before introducing cross-border care. On the other hand, 
the degree of patient mobility and therefore the intensity of competition tends to be 
underestimated because patients are assumed to bear the whole costs for medical 
treatment. These two effects might compensate each other. 
Nevertheless, according to the results the following conclusions can be drawn from 
analysis: 
– Cross-border care can be expected to improve efficiency and welfare in the health 
services sector. The intensity of competition depends on patient mobility, which is 
determined by quality differences in medical services and individual costs, including 
fees and transaction costs. Since transaction costs can be expected to be related to 
distance, neighbourstates are more likely to get involved into competition. 
– Welfare gains from liberalization are strongly determined by interregional differences 
in the quality of health services. Compared to the influence of quality, the impact of 
subsidization on overall welfare prooves to be of minor relevance. 
– Subsidizing health care capacities which are also used by migrating patients from 
low-quality regions does not necessarily lead to welfare losses in the high-quality 
state. On the contrary, for realistic subsidy rates a net welfare gain can be realized. 
Still, simulations show that these welfare gains are rather small and their significance 
prooves to be sensible to the extent domestic capacities are used by foreign patients. 
Since, after full liberalization, patient migration cannot be controlled by the national 
governments, high-quality regions cannot be expected to support a complete 






Derivation of demand functions 
 
A. Monopoly   
Country 1 
 
Consumers maximize utility 
[A1]      given the budget constraint   z x ax z x U + − =
2
1 5 , 0 ) , (
[A2]   ,  s = t.  () z p x t s p M z x + + − = 1
In the non-tradeables case before deregulation, the per unit subsidy equals the per unit 
tax (s = t) , so the net effect on the price of health services is zero (see page 10). 
 
The price pz of the numéraire z is normalized to 1 and the optimalization problem is 
solved by substitution: 
[A3]  z = M1 – pxx    inserted in [I] leads to the equivalent objective 
[A4]    ) ( 5 , 0 ) ( 1
2
1 x p M x ax x O x − − − =
Maximization of [A4] with respect to x leads to the inverse demand function: 





∂ 1 = 0    => 
[A6]  px = a - x 







[B1]  + z    is maximized under the budget constraint  
2
1 1 1 5 , 0 ) , ( x ax z x U − =
[B2]     ,  s ≠ .  () z p x t s p M z x + + − = 1 1 t
Since  , substitution of z yields  t s ≠
[B3]    () [] 1 1
2
1 1 1 5 , 0 ) ( x t s p M x ax x O x + − − − − =
and maximization of the equivalent objective 
[B4]  t s p x a
x
O





1 = 0    => 
leads to the demand function 
[B5]    t s x a px − + − = 1
 
Country 2 
After deregulation the benefit function also includes the high-quality service x 
[B6] U     a > 1, b = 1  z y bx y x y ax z y x + − − − + = 2
2 2
2 2 2 5 , 0 5 , 0 ) , , (
The price of the high-quality good depends on transaction costs k and subsidies s. 
[B7]    () z y p x k s p M y x ⋅ + + + − = 1 2 2
The equivalent objective 
[B8]    () y p x k s p M y bx y x y ax O y x − + − − + − − − + = 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 5 , 0 5 , 0
is maximized with respect to x2 and y, which leads to the inverse demand functions 
[B9]    k s x a px − + − = 2
[B10]    2 1 x y py − − =
Adding [B9] and [B10] leads to aggregate demand for x = x1 + x2 in duopoly: 
[B11]  ) ( ) ( 2 1 2
1 y x x k t s a x p
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